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Intersections of rape myth acceptance and victim-blame
A number of studies of beliefs and attitudes surrounding rape and sexual assault have
sought to show empirically that we live in a culture in which certain types of victims
tend to be blamed for their own attack. According to these studies, victim-blame can
be explained by the widespread popular acceptance of the traditional sexual double
standard (which says that sexual behaviour that is acceptable for men is unacceptable* The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, as well as the following friends and
colleagues, for comments and feedback on previous drafts of this paper: Harry Annison, Ummni
Khan, Imogen Jones and Helen Reece.
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2 Legal Studiesfor women),1 and rape myths (eg that ‘real rape’ involves a pathological stranger who
unleashes a ‘blitz’-style attack outside, at night and using overwhelming force).2 A
woman who is raped or sexually assaulted in circumstances that run counter to that
stereotype, who may have been drinking,3 who dressed provocatively4 or who per-
haps invited a man home for ‘coffee’5 and then failed to communicate her refusal
effectively6 may be blamed for precipitating her own victimisation and, as such,
made to bear a degree of responsibility that ought to fall squarely on the rapist.7
Victim-blame may be regarded as a further wrong suffered by victims, as well as
inﬂicting further harm in terms of the victim’s self-esteem, her capacity to recover
from the ordeal. Since the relevant rape myths and sexual double-standards affect
the perceptions of both lay people and legal professionals, victim-blaming attitudes
are also said to affect the chances of an offender being tried and punished by the crim-
inal justice system.8
This paper does not take issue with the characterisation of victim-blame as wrong-
ful and harmful, and indeed I would strongly emphasise that being ‘critical’ about
victim-blame requires insisting ﬁrst that it is rapists and not their victims who are
blamed for rape. It was because it was read as undermining this principle that the
NHS/Home Ofﬁce poster ‘One in Three Reported Rapes Happens When the Victim1. NB Gray, GJ Palileo and D Johnson ‘Explaining rape victim-blame: a test of attribution the-
ory’ (1993) 13 Sociol Spectrum 377; M Duran et al ‘Social perceptions of rape victims in dating
and married relationships: the role of perpetrator’s benevolent sexism’ (2010) 62 Sex Roles 505;
R Allison and BJ Risman ‘A double standard for “hooking up”: how far have we come toward
gender equality?’ (2013) 42(5) Soc Sci Res 1191–1206; LA Rudman, JC Fetterolf and DT
Sanchez ‘What motivates the sexual double standard? More support for male versus female con-
trol theory’ (2013) 39(2) Pers Soc Psychol Bull 250.
2. PA Newcombe et al ‘Attributions of responsibility for rape: differences across familiarity of
situation, gender, and acceptance of rape myths’ (2008) 38(7) J Appl Soc Psychol 1736; L Ellison
and VMunro ‘Better the devil you know? “Real rape” stereotypes and the relevance of a previous
relationship in (mock) juror deliberations’ (2013) 17(4) Int’l J Evidence & Proof 299.
3. E Finch and V Munro ‘Demon drink and the demonized woman: socio-sexual stereotypes
and responsibility attribution in rape trials involving intoxicants’ (2007) 16(4) Soc & Legal Stud
591; C Gunby, A Carline and C Beynon ‘Alcohol-related rape cases: barristers’ perspectives on
the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and its impact on practice’ (2010) 74(6) J Crim L 579; S Wallerstein
‘“A drunken consent is still consent” – or is it? A critical analysis of the law on a drunken consent
to sex following Bree’ (2009) 73(4) J Crim L 318.
4. J Ringrose and E Renold ‘Slut-shaming, girl power and “sexualisation”: thinking through the
politics of the international SlutWalks with teen girls’ (2012) 24(3) Gender & Educ 333–343.
5. BMasser, K Lees and BMMcKimmie ‘Badwoman, bad victim? Disentangling the effects of
victim stereotypicality, gender stereotypicality and benevolent sexism on acquaintance rape
victim-blame’ (2009) 62 Sex Roles 494.
6. SE Hickman and C L Muehlenhard ‘“By the semi-mystical appearance of a condom”: how
young women and men communicate sexual consent in heterosexual situations’ (1999) 36(3) J
Sex Res 258.
7. See generally A Carline and P Easteal Shades of Grey – Domestic and Sexual Violence
Against Women (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) pp 159–160. Women are ‘frequently judged and
considered to be blameworthy due to their behaviour’. B Russell, DL Oswald and SW Kraus
‘Evaluations of sexual assault: perceptions of guilt and legal elements for male and female aggres-
sors using various coercive strategies’ (2011) 26(6) Violence and Victims 799.
8. A perception understood to warrant the publication of model directions for directing
Crown Court juries to counter ‘entrenched … stereotypical opinions’: see Carline and Easteal,
above n 7, p 160.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 3has been Drinking’ was widely criticised in the UK in 2014.9 However, broadly
speaking, there are two types of questions legitimately to be raised regarding the
way in which some currently inﬂuential studies draw victim-blame as a symptom
of rape myth acceptance, where rape myths are understood to be beliefs about rape
or sexual assault that are either factually wrong or else unacceptable on ethical
grounds.10 First, identifying that a given response to an alleged rape or sexual as-
sault constitutes victim-blame requires that the person concerned is in fact a victim
and not something else. As I suggest below, a conceptual framework in which rape
myth acceptance is understood to provide the key to identifying victim-blame may
not always be the most reliable. Take, for example, the well-known myth that says
that ‘women often lie about being raped’.11 Anyone who is familiar with rape myth
acceptance scholarship understands that such a statement describes a stereotype that,
if believed, may be damaging to the credibility of a particular complainant. But do
we endorse or perpetuate this rape myth if we insist on drawing a sharp distinction
between complainants (who may or may not have been raped) and victims (whose
victimhood is acknowledged and recognised) until the truth of the complainant’s
account has been decided by a jury? Carline and Easteal, in their chapters on the
damaging effects of a prevailing ‘climate of suspicion’ in the reporting, pre-trial
and trial stages of the criminal justice system, seem to imply as much in their re-
peated use the word ‘victim’ interchangeably with ‘complainant’.12 Of course there
are very good reasons to keep up pressure on criminal justice systems to ensure that
women who bring complaints are not dissuaded from doing so, and that deserving
cases are not dropped prematurely. However, for the purposes of analysing victim-
blame in a scholarly context, it would be a mistake to draw from the fact that the
‘lying rape complainant’ is a stereotype, that victimhood is established from the point
at which a complaint is made. In cases in which the question of what actually con-
stitutes victimisation arises, to do so would be to conﬂate two different conceptual
categories: a slippage that is liable to mislead us in understanding popular responses
to rape and sexual assault.
Secondly, given the strongly negative moral implications of ‘blame’ in this context,
victim-blame must necessarily be distinguished from responses to victims that may be
something other than blame. A 2005 study commissioned by Amnesty International
claimed to have uncovered evidence of a disturbing ‘blame culture’ in the UK, includ-
ing 26% of people asked who seemed to regard a woman at least partly to blame if
she wore ‘sexy clothing’.13 However, the question actually asked of participants of9. J May ‘NHS & Home Ofﬁce: remove all copies of this victim-blaming poster’ Change.org;
available at https://www.change.org/p/jeremy-hunt-nhs-home-ofﬁce-remove-all-copies-of-this-
victim-blaming-poster (accessed 22 July 2015).
10. H Gerger et al ‘The acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression scale: develop-
ment and validation in German and English’ (2007) 33 Aggress Behav 422–440.
11. M Burton ‘How different are “false” allegations of rape from false complaints of GBH?’
(2013) 3 Crim L Rev 203; H Littleton ‘Rape myths and beyond: a commentary on Edwards
and colleagues (2011)’ (2011) 65 Sex Roles 792; KMRyan ‘The relationship between rape myths
and sexual scripts: the social construction of rape’ (2011) 65 Sex Roles 774.
12. Carline and Easteal, above, n 7, p 163ff.
13. Amnesty International ‘UK: new poll ﬁnds a third of people believe women who ﬂirt par-
tially responsible for being raped’; available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uk-
new-poll-ﬁnds-third-people-believe-women-who-ﬂirt-partially-responsible-being (accessed 22
July 2015).
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4 Legal Studiesthat study was whether a victim was totally, partly or not at all ‘responsible’ for an
assault on account of their behaviour. Crucially, answers that say that a victim was
‘partly responsible’ may indicate a negative moral judgement, but at the same time
may also indicate ‘a more benign belief that a victim’s behaviour had enhanced her
vulnerability to being raped’.14 This unfortunate conﬂation of responsibility and
blame must be understood against the context of rape myths discourse. For it is be-
cause the idea that a victim of rape or sexual assault might have done something to
precipitate the attack is a myth – that is, either factually wrong or else factually accu-
rate but wrong in an ethical sense – that makes raising questions about ‘likelihood’
and ‘responsibility’ on the part of the victim so fraught and politically charged. As
we will see below, if it is ethically unacceptable to suggest that any aspect of the vic-
tim’s behaviour might have been relevant to the fact that she was sexually assaulted or
raped, then the possibility that participants of the relevant research studies might have
been expressing something other than victim-blaming attitudes becomes problemati-
cally difﬁcult to identify.The structure and scope of the paper
It should be emphasised here that this paper does not in any way seek to downplay,
deny or trivialise sexual victimisation. The critical remarks below are instead directed
towards understanding ‘victim-blame’ as a social and cultural phenomenon: it
considers arguments about what actually constitutes victim-blame as such, and
arguments about where victim-blame comes from. To this end, the paper identiﬁes
and critiques scholarly arguments with respect to three purported ways in which
victim-blame in cases of male-on-female rape and sexual assault tends to be
explained by the fact of popular acceptance of rape myths. The ﬁrst of these says that
victim-blame may ﬂow from myths about women precipitating their own rapes and
sexual assaults by their own risky behaviours. Section 1 (‘Victim-blame and risk:
myths and facts’) highlights two strands of thinking amongst the relevant scholarship.
The ﬁrst of these insists that the idea of increased risks for women as a result of
their own behaviour is itself a myth; the second acknowledges a factual basis for
understanding risk, but goes on to insist that women make themselves vulnerable
to those risks unwittingly because they themselves so ﬁrmly believe in the real rape
myth.15 This section argues that within both strands of thinking, the privileged status
accorded to rape myth acceptance is questionable, and that claims to be able to identify
victim-blaming attitudes that apparently ﬂow from rape myth acceptance need to be
treated with caution.
Secondly, someone who would hold a woman responsible for her own rape or
sexual assault on the basis that she failed to give a clear and explicit refusal may
be afﬁrming the myth of ‘miscommunication’.16 Section 2 (‘Victim-blame and
mythical thinking about “miscommunication” and “seedy” sex’) acknowledges that
miscommunication is indeed both factually and normatively problematic. It goes
on to argue, however, that the evidence of miscommunication serving merely as a14. Quoting Ellison and Munro, above n 2 [at fn 4]. See also Gray et al, above n 1, who also
draw conclusions about ‘blame’ from having asked questions about ‘responsibility’ (see esp
p 380).
15. Rudman et al, above n 1, represents that ﬁrst strand; Littleton, above n 11, represents the
second.
16. Hickman and Muehlenhard, above n 6.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 5cynical excuse for sexual coercion is not sufﬁciently strong or generalisable to justify
deeming the very idea to be a rape myth. Furthermore, studies that identify victim-
blaming attitudes via the miscommunication ‘myth’ can sometimes be shown to
confuse, on the one hand, the issue of a woman’s freedom and/or capacity to consent
in any given context and, on the other, the quite separate issue of the normative
quality (the ‘seediness’) of certain sexual behaviours.
Thirdly, where a woman is deemed to have ‘chosen’ to engage in sexual activity in
circumstances in which her freedom to do otherwise may have been constrained, this
may also be viewed as victim-blaming. Section 3 (‘Victim-blame, and choice as myth’)
agrees that to rely uncritically on liberal contractarian ideology of choice often obscures
the real constraints on freedom that many women face, particularly women living in cir-
cumstances of economic hardship. However, it also argues in favour of recognising the
possibility of choice even within compromised circumstances, and that whether or not
such a choice has been made must make room for the possibility that a person may con-
sent to sex for reasons other than authentic sexual desire. As in section 2, the argument
of section 3 identiﬁes in relevant studies an analytical slippage in the relevant literature
between assessments of consent and assessments of the quality of the sex involved; in
other words, a tendency to conﬂate judgements about whether this particular woman
did or did not choose sex, with judgements about whether any woman would or would
not choose sex in certain circumstances.
Due to constraints on space, this paper will not attempt to offer a comprehensive
critical review of the vast body of scholarship on rape myths and the various ways
in which these are theorised with respect to gender and victimhood. It focuses
instead on some particularly signiﬁcant examples of relevant work, including stud-
ies by psychologists, sociologists and criminologists that have informed and inﬂu-
enced legal scholarship.17 Each of the three main sections of this paper
(described above) is split into two subsections. The ﬁrst of these subsections puts
a particular aspect of the purported connection between rape myth acceptance and
victim-blame under critical scrutiny in general terms, and considers a broad spec-
trum of relevant literature. The second of the subsections undertakes a close reading
of one particular recent study, and draws from it elements that I suggest are repre-
sentative of a much broader set of methodological problems. These close readings
will comprise both a critique of the researchers’ analysis as well as my own re-
reading of the data, in order to illustrate an alternative narrative on rape myth
acceptance and victim-blame. The study in question is ‘Sex Without Consent,
I Suppose That Is Rape’: How Young People in England Understand Sexual Consent,
conducted by Maddy Coy, Liz Kelly and colleagues at the Child & Woman Abuse
Studies Unit (London Metropolitan University), and published by the Ofﬁce of the
Children’s Commissioner.18 As I shall explain below, Coy et al’s study is, on the
one hand, representative of a feminist conceptual framework shared more broadly
by other studies in which rape myth acceptance serves to identify and to explain17. For a more wide-ranging critical review, see H Reece ‘Rapemyths: is elite opinion right and
popular opinion wrong?’ (2013) 33(3) Oxford J Legal Stud 445; see also D Gurnham ‘A critique
of carceral feminist arguments on rape myths and sexual scripts’ New Crim L Rev, forthcoming.
18. MCoy et al ‘Sex Without Consent, I Suppose That Is Rape’: How Young People in England
Understand Sexual Consent (London: Ofﬁce of the Children’s Commissioner, 2013); available at
http://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/publications/sex-without-consent-i-suppose-rape-
how-young-people-england-understand-sexual-consent (accessed 23 July 2015).
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6 Legal Studiesvictim-blame.19 On the other hand, it is distinctive in its own right inasmuch as it
focuses on the attitudes and beliefs of people who would be too young to have
participated in (say) mock jury research and, being published by the Ofﬁce of the
Children’s Commissioner in 2013, provides a timely insight into the sort of research
that is attracting the attention of relevant policy-focused bodies outside of academia.
Most importantly, though, the ﬁctional scenarios that Coy et al’s study presents
usefully distil some of the key ambiguities in sexual behaviour that allow us to
reﬂect critically on which sorts of responses we regard as victim-blaming, and which
we do not. These qualities in combination make Coy et al’s study particularly helpful
as an object both for close scrutiny and for broader debate.1. VICTIM-BLAME AND RISK: MYTHS AND FACTS
Debating risk: responsibility and vulnerability
Let us focus here on the ﬁrst of the ways identiﬁed above inwhich victim-blame intersects
with rape myths: the myth that says that a woman’s risk of being raped or sexually
assaulted may be increased by own behaviour or decisions. In order to understand
victim-blame in this context, we need to distinguish two quite different strands of
feminist-informed scholarly thinking on rape myths. On the one hand, studies such as
Rudman et al and Gray et al have taken the view that the very idea that a woman’s
own behaviour might make rape more likely is itself a rape myth.20 This is presumably
because they regard it as impossible to accept that the likelihood of rape and sexual assault
is greater for women who engage in behaviours such as drinking, ﬂirting, dressing in cer-
tain ways, casual sex and so on without also running the risk of implicitly endorsing the
traditional double standard, and hence the responsibilising and blaming of victims. Other
commentators, by contrast, have been more prepared to run that particular risk, and in
doing so show up the limitations of that position. For example, in a statement of fact
not dissimilar to the much-criticised ‘One in Three Reported Rapes’ NHS/Home Ofﬁce
poster, Littleton et al state: ‘Alcohol use is also ubiquitous in sexual assaults among
college women, with one recent survey ﬁnding that 72% of a sample of US college rape
victims reported that they were intoxicated at the time of the rape.’21 Feminist-informed
studies have similarly identiﬁed increased risks for womenwho engage in scripted refusal
(saying ‘no’ when meaning ‘yes’), promiscuity and early sexual activity,22 and more19. See eg L Ellison and VMunro ‘Of “normal sex” and “real rape”: exploring the use of socio-
sexual scripts in (mock) jury deliberation’ (2009) 18(3) Soc & Legal Stud 291; H Littleton et al
‘Risky situation or harmless fun? A qualitative examination of college women’s bad hook-up and
rape scripts’ (2009) 60 Sex Roles 793–804; C Gunby, A Carline and C Beynon ‘Regretting it af-
ter? Focus group perspectives on alcohol consumption, nonconsensual sex and false allegations
of rape’ (2013) 22(1) Soc & Legal Stud 87.
20. Gray et al, above n 1, whose eight-item scale to test for rape myth acceptance includes state-
ments such as: ‘When females go around braless or wearing short skirts and tight tops, they are
asking for trouble.’ By using the phrases ‘go around’ and ‘asking for trouble’, the researchers
seem to be interested in victim-blaming attitudes. However, the statement may be broad and
vague enough also to catch people who (correctly) perceive an increased risk of assault, but with-
out regarding such females as culpable. The same might be said of another of the eight items on
that scale, namely: ‘Many females who get raped have done something to provoke it.’
21. Littleton et al, above n 19, at 794.
22. BKrahé, S Bieneck and R Scheinberger-Olwig ‘Adolescents’ sexual scripts: schematic rep-
resentations of consensual and nonconsensual heterosexual interactions (2007) 44 J Sex Res 316.
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 7generally to traditionally counter-normative sexual behaviour, such as engaging in multi-
partner sex, possibly with strangers and/or for material reward.23
This second strand of scholarly intervention does not deny (and in fact afﬁrms) that a
woman’s own chosen behaviour may put her at an increased risk of being raped or sex-
ually assaulted. But instead of ‘responsibility’ for the consequences of their choices,
these interventions speak of women’s vulnerability: to the social and cultural dangers
of being stigmatised for behaviour for which men are not stigmatised (the sexual double
standard),24 to being sexually coerced when they do so25 and then to being blamed for
this. Although it is has been suggested elsewhere that this approach of distinguishing
‘responsibility’ and ‘vulnerability’ is actually a linguistic fudge that dresses up in ac-
ceptable guise arguments that in other contexts would be condemned as victim-
blame,26 I do not think this is necessarily so. The distinction emphasises that engaging
in victim-blame in this context involves adopting a double standard in response to risk;
that is, to use the facts about risk in order to advocate for women to place limits on their
choices, where no such limitations are placed on men.27 However, this argument itself
runs into difﬁculties when it seeks to avoid ‘responsibilising’ victims by premising
women’s ‘vulnerability’ on the dominance of the real rape myth and hence on an as-
sumption that young women lack insight into the risks of certain behaviours.
Research by Littleton et al on the attitudes of young female college students seeks to
show that the real rape myth impacts so powerfully upon public perceptions that women
who engage in alcohol-fuelled ‘hook-ups’ (an example of a circumstance that is re-
moved from the real rape stereotype) do not recognise or acknowledge the dangers
therein of sexual coercion.28 Likewise, Turchik et al showed that female college
students may be unable to recognise the danger signs in risky contexts because they
are themselves conditioned to think of rape only in terms of blitz/stranger rape.29 Both
studies purport to show that young women, because they themselves accept the real
rape myth, are unable or unwilling to see themselves as victims of rape even when they
actually experience it. They thus fall into a cycle of repeated ‘re-victimisation risk be-
haviours’, typically never realising the truth that they are being raped and/or
assaulted.30 These and other studies purporting to demonstrate the popular
acceptance of rape myths have already been criticised in various ways that I will not
rehearse here.31 However, I would emphasise that their reliance on the notion of23. Coy et al, above n 18, pp 21–36.
24. Littleton, above n 11, at 793: ‘[W]omen who are more sexually assertive/aggressive or who
engage in less common sexual acts are particularly likely to be viewed in a negative stigmatized
manner.’
25. Ibid: ‘Women who are labelled in this manner [as ‘sluts’ or as ‘easy’] are often regarded as
appropriate targets for aggressive sexual advances by men and as having fewer rights to refuse
these advances.’
26. See eg Reece, above n 17.
27. As Wallerstein (above n 3) puts it: ‘the law should be designed to protect the vulnerable
even if they got into this vulnerable position stupidly and by their own doing. The fact that a
woman takes a risk does not mean that she now is responsible for all the normal consequences
of her actions …’ (at 327).
28. Littleton et al, above n 19.
29. JA Turchik et al ‘Personality, sexuality, and substance use as predictors of sexual risk tak-
ing in college students’ (2010) 47 J Sex Res 411.
30. Littleton, above n 11, at 795.
31. See Gurnham, above n 17; Reece, above n 17.
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8 Legal Studies‘re-victimisation’ is problematic for understanding victim-blame, because it conﬂates
the two different notions of running the risk of being victimised and actually being
victimised. Within a conceptual framework in which the real rape myth is credited with
the power to prevent young people understanding when they are being coerced, these
two notions become fused into one heading (‘re-victimisation behaviours’) that claims
to offer an objective way of identifying ‘victims’ that bypasses the subjective experi-
ence of the woman involved.
Risk, vulnerability and the real rape myth: ‘Tashi’ and ‘Monique’
At this point, we come to the ﬁrst of three close readings of Coy et al’s research, con-
ducted by survey and focus groups on 497 young people aged 13–19. Like Littleton et al
and Turchik et al, this study also employs the real rape myth to explain their respon-
dents’ failures to identify rape and sexual assault in a range of ﬁctional scenarios. For
example, Coy et al note that, in response to a story in which a 15-year-old male called
Josh had sex with his girlfriend Tashi after they had both become ‘drunk’ at a party and
she had ‘passed out’, only 58.6% of respondents said that they were ‘Not OK with the
sex described’.32 That of the same group of respondents, 72.6% also said this amounted
to rape (75.1% of females, 65.1% of males) may additionally suggest that for many
young people, sex without consent is sometimes ‘okay’ even though it constitutes rape.
Coy et al argue that the reason for this apparent approval of rape might be explained by
the assumption that ‘there was some kind of ongoing, taken for granted, consent on
which Josh could draw’ as Tashi’s boyfriend, and that this illustrates respondents
‘drawing on stereotypes of rape as committed by strangers’.33 Coy et al contrast this
against a scenario in which 17-year-old Monique wakes up one morning after a night
out at a club, feeling ‘disoriented, confused and achy’, missing her handbag and phone,
ﬁnding ‘evidence of sexual intercourse in her underwear’ but not being able to remember
anything from the night before, after having been followed into a toilet cubicle by a man
she had only just met. In response to this scenario, 88.9% of respondents were ‘Not OK
with the sex described’, with 93.2% identifying what had happened to her as rape (with
no signiﬁcant difference between males’ and females’ responses). Coy et al explain the
greater and more consistent recognition of the incident as a crime as ‘undoubtedly due
to in part to [sic] the limited relationship between the parties; this scenario is closer
to the stereotype of “real rape”…’34 However, I would take issue with this conﬁdent
assertion about the signiﬁcance of the real rape myth.
In the ‘Tashi and Josh’ scenario, for example, the ﬁrst thing that we learn is that ‘Josh is
15 and has been going out with Tashi, his “gorgeous, smart” girlfriend for four months.’
Respondents may have sensed, therefore, that the researchers intended to imply some sig-
niﬁcance in the described context of an already established sexual relationship, and in this
they would of course be correct. But if, as Coy et al claim, ‘many’ of the respondents saw
that signiﬁcance as signalling that explicit consent is not necessary in a sexual relationship
(and that this could not be rape by virtue of that relationship),35 there is equally evidence,
not acknowledged by Coy et al, that such a view evaporates as respondents mature from
13 to 18.While it is true that only 50.5% of 13–14-year-olds were ‘Not OKwith the sex
described’, this rises dramatically to 70.8% for 16–18-year-olds. Likewise, since we are32. Coy et al, above n 18, p 21.
33. Ibid, p 22.
34. Ibid, p 26 (my emphasis).
35. Ibid, p 21.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 9invited by the researchers to place signiﬁcance on the fact that only 62.2% of
13–14-year-old respondents identiﬁed the scenario as rape, then we should note that this
also rises signiﬁcantly to 81.4% for 16–18-year-olds. Coy et al do not remark on either of
these aspects of their ﬁndings. I would suggest that it should not be at all surprising that
young peoples’ ability to think critically about consent to sex within relationships will
develop and improve in this way as they themselves gain knowledge and experience
of sex and relationships as well as of consent and coercion, and conﬁrmation of this
upward trajectory must surely be cause for an optimism that Coy et al do not admit.
Nor do Coy et al comment on the possible wider signiﬁcance of these ﬁndings at both
ends of the age range. At the top of the higher end, respondents are at an age at which
they will be eligible for jury service, and at the lower end, the fact that children as young
as 13 demonstrate that they can engage meaningfully in a discussion of this kind about
consent at all is itself impressive, given that they are still three years short of attaining
the intellectual and emotional maturity necessary to give legally valid sexual consent
themselves.
This, of course, does not prove that Coy et al are wrong to conclude that the obvious
differences between the ‘Tashi’ scenario and the real rape myth played a role in respon-
dents’ views, but attention to what Coy et al leave out from their analysis must at the
very least give us pause before accepting their claims about the impact of stereotypical
differences between stranger and partner rape. In the case of the second scenario,
involving Monique (waking up having blacked out in the nightclub toilet cubicle),
we note that, despite Coy et al’s conﬁdent assertion that the fact of the man involved
being a stranger ‘undoubtedly’ contributed to respondents’ almost unanimous judge-
ment that it constituted rape, no evidence that this reasoning was signiﬁcant is offered.
Instead, the only two responses quoted focus on capacity: ‘she can’t even remember
what happened, which shows she couldn’t say yes or no’ (18-year-old male); ‘she can’t
say yes, she can’t say no’ (14-year-old male). Additionally, an explicitly victim-blam-
ing statement is included from a 19-year-old male respondent: ‘Girl went out at a young
age out to a place she’s not meant to be… To be honest I think that’s her own fault.’But
since the scenario is designed to come closest to the stereotype of real rape (in which
respondents are supposedly most attuned to the fact of a rape having been committed),
such a response does little to support Coy et al’s argument that the real rape myth makes
rape easier to recognise and take seriously in this scenario. If this suggests anything at
all, it can only be that the connection between rape myth acceptance and victim-blame is
weaker than has been claimed.2. VICTIM-BLAME AND MYTHICAL THINKING ABOUT
‘MISCOMMUNICATION’ AND ‘SEEDY’ SEX
Blamed for not saying no?
This section addresses the second of the three purported intersections between rape
myth acceptance and victim-blame. Here, we consider whether the excuse of miscom-
munication is a rape myth, and whether allowing an alleged attacker to rely on it
amounts to blaming the victim (ie for ‘failing’ to communicate her refusal effectively).
As a legal question in England and Wales, s 1(1)(c) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
stipulates that a ‘reasonable belief’ in consent will separate the accused from a convic-
tion for rape or sexual assault even if all of the other requirements are proved. This
arguably allows for the possibility that in some circumstances a jury might decide that
it was ‘reasonable’ for a man to have taken a woman’s lack of explicit refusal as an© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
10 Legal Studiesindication of willingness.36 But in deﬁning a ‘reasonable belief’, s 1(2) then refers to
‘any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents’, implying that there ought
to be no reason to place a responsibility on the complainant to have actively refused
to give consent if the accused made no attempt to ascertain it. Empirical studies can
shed some light on popular beliefs and attitudes with regard to the possibility and
meaning of miscommunication, albeit with results that are sometimes inconsistent
and contradictory. For example, studies by Clark and Carroll and by Hickman and
Muehlenhard both report that men are more likely than women to interpret reluctant
passive acquiescence as consent or at least as understandable miscommunication.37
However, a study by Gunby et al reported more women than men attributing respon-
sibility to other women to say ‘no’ in communicating refusal for a credible complaint
to be made.38
As we found in the previous section, much of the debate about whether miscommu-
nication constitutes victim-blame dovetails with talk about ‘responsibility’, or as Coy et
al put it, the ‘moral responsibility on young women to police and maintain bound-
aries’.39 Research by, for example, Melanie Beres40 and Kitzinger and Frith41
suggests that to expect women to ‘take responsibility’ for communicating refusal in a
sexual context is unjustiﬁably to treat sexual communication differently from any other
sort of communicative exchange, since in fact both men and women routinely give and
understand refusals that are made indirectly, whatever the setting. Indeed, a number of
studies agree that to credit miscommunication as a genuine problem is dangerous be-
cause it allows men cynically to pretend to misunderstand indirect or implicit
refusals.42
But although treating miscommunication as a myth would seem to give us a useful
and progressive way of tackling its potentially dangerous and responsibilising impli-
cations, we must acknowledge that there have also been studies indicating a factual
basis for it. While arguably limited in their usefulness, for reasons that I shall describe
here, these studies cannot be simply be dismissed as attempts merely to ﬁnd excuses
for rape or sexual assault. Two studies led by clinical psychologist Charlene L
Muehlenhard reported alarmingly high usages of ‘token resistance’ and ‘scripted
refusal’ (ie the practice of saying ‘no’ when they ‘had every intention to and were
willing to engage in sexual intercourse’) amongst young women with new sexual36. GE Panichas ‘Simple rape and the risks of sex’ (2006) 25 Law & Phil 613.
37. MD Clark and MH Carroll ‘Acquaintance rape scripts of women and men: similarities and
differences’ (2008) 58 Sex Roles 619 at 623; Hickman and Muehlenhard, above n 6.
38. Gunby et al, above n 19.
39. Coy et al, above n 18, p 33.
40. M Beres ‘Sexual miscommunication? Untangling assumptions about sexual communica-
tion between casual sex partners’ (2010) 12(1) Culture Health & Sexuality 1.
41. C Kitzinger and H Frith ‘Just say no? The use of conversation analysis in developing a
feminist perspective on sexual refusal’ (1999) 10(3) Discourse & Soc’y 293.
42. KN Jozkowski and ZD Peterson ‘College students and sexual consent: unique insights’
(2013) 50 J Sex Res 517 at 521–522; Beres, above n 39; Kitzinger and Frith, above n 41; S Hansen,
R O’Byrne and M Rapely ‘Young heterosexual men’s use of the miscommunication model in
explaining acquaintance rape’ (2010) 7 Sexuality Res & Soc Pol’y 45; M O’Byrne, M Rapely
and SHansen ‘“You couldn’t say ‘No’, could you?”Youngmen’s understandings of sexual refusal’
(2006) 16 Feminism & Psychol 133.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 11partners.43 It has since been shown that these studies were methodologically ﬂawed,
and Ellison and Munro are quite right to refer to them dismissively as making ‘dubious
claims’.44 The ﬂaw lay in the fact thatMuehelenhard et al’s questions did not distinguish
clearly between refusing sex and not wanting sex, such that the apparently high numbers
of women reporting to have used scripted refusal and token resistance may in fact be ex-
plained by women’s genuine refusals being miscategorised when they reported refusing
sex, not because they did not desire it but because, say, they didn’t have a condom.
The problem with the sort of dismissal of Muehlenhard’s scripted refusal/token resis-
tance studies as made by Ellison and Munro, however, is that it fails to acknowledge
that this ﬂaw was later recognised and corrected in a subsequent study by Muehlenhard
and Rogers, who found that even excluding the previously miscategorised genuine re-
fusals, a smaller but not insigniﬁcant number of people had used ‘no’ in a ‘scripted’
sense (ie meaning ‘yes’).45 Ellison and Munro are not alone in ignoring the later study
by Muehlenhard and Rogers: their important corrective is rarely, if ever, acknowledged
in feminist-informed legal scholarship on rape myths. Such an omission is understand-
able politically, but it suggests to me a certain lack of balance in the handling of relevant
psychology and sociology research ﬁndings by legal scholars. The point that must be
emphasised here is that however difﬁcult wemight ﬁnd the idea of people using scripted
reluctance and refusal as part of a favoured sexual script, simply to ignore those ﬁndings
is not the same thing as refuting them. Muehlenhard and Rogers’ later study may itself
now (at time of writing) be 17 years old and hence a study of a previous generation of
young people. But it is important to keep in mind that Ellison and Munro’s dismissal in
2009 of Muehlenhard et al’s earlier studies was not based on the fact that they were car-
ried out so many years ago, but because their methodology was demonstrably ﬂawed in
some speciﬁc way. Even if the ﬁndings of Muehlenhard and Rogers have not speciﬁ-
cally been conﬁrmed, evidence of their continuing relevance can be found in the large
number of studies published since then that indicate that a lack of explicit consent – and
the possibility of danger that this brings – is explicitly or implicitly eroticised in a good
deal of sexual behaviour experienced as non-coercive and non-victimising.4643. C Muehlenhard and L Hollabaugh ‘Do women sometimes say no when they mean yes? The
prevalence and correlates of women’s token resistance to sex’ (1988) 54 J Personality & Soc
Psychol 872. In Texas, 39% of 610 female students reported using ‘token resistance’. CL
Muehlenhard and ML McCoy ‘Double-standard double bind – the sexual double-standard and
women’s communication about sex’ (1991) 15 Psychol Women Q 447. Of the 403 female respon-
dents, 37.2% had used scripted refusals with a new partner. The key question asked of respondents
was: ‘Youwere with a guy who wanted to engage in sexual intercourse and you wanted to also, but
for some reason you indicated that you didn’t want to, although you had every intention to andwere
willing to engage in sexual intercourse. In other words, you indicated “no” and you meant “yes.”’
44. Ellison and Munro, above n 19.
45. That is, 15.4% of women and 12.5% of men: CL Muehlenhard and CS Rogers ‘Token re-
sistance to sex: new perspectives on an old stereotype’ (1998) 22 Psychol Women Q 443.
46. ZD Peterson and CLMuehlenhard ‘Conceptualizing the “wantedness” of women’s consen-
sual and nonconsensual sexual experiences: implications for how women label their experiences
with rape’ (2007) 44(1) J Sex Res 72; Hickman and Muehlenhard, above n 6; T Humphreys ‘Per-
ceptions of sexual consent: the impact of relationship history and gender’ (2007) 44(4) J Sex Res
307; Jozkowski and Peterson, above n 42; GY Lim and ME Roloff ‘Attributing sexual consent’
(1999) 27 J Appl Comm Res 1; SA Vannier and LF O’Sullivan ‘Communicating interest in sex:
verbal and nonverbal initiation of sexual activity in young adults’ romantic dating relationships’
(2011) 40(5) Arch Sexual Behav 961; V Cameron-Lewis and L Allen ‘Teaching pleasure and
danger in sexuality education’ (2013) 13(2) Sex Educ 121.
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12 Legal StudiesAt the same time, studies that purport to indicate that claims about women giving
confusing cues are generally false – and hence that miscommunication can be regarded
as a ‘myth’ – suffer from difﬁculties inherent in the drawing of general conclusions
from narratives that range across all kinds of sexual behaviours and forms of commu-
nication. For example, Melanie Beres’ study of communication between casual sex
partners (based on interviews with just 10 men and 11 women) attempts to draw a gen-
eral impression about miscommunication as a myth in the ﬁrst instance from her inter-
viewees’ conﬁdent assertions that they ‘just know’ an indirect refusal when they see
it.47 Following this rather naïve acceptance of her interviewees’ claims as fact, she then
applies a heavily theorised analysis in order to ‘demonstrate’ howmen cynically deploy
‘miscommunication’ to get away with sexual coercion, and how women allow them to
do this. Hence, a female interviewee (Jane, aged 19) describes an incident in which
rather than explicitly communicating consent she ‘just kinda went with it’ and that
‘it just kind of happened’, despite not actively wanting sex. Beres concludes that
‘By not refusing sex, she does not risk being in a position where he might not listen
to her refusal and thus risk getting raped.’48 Passing over Jane’s own stated reﬂections
on her partner’s potential as a rapist (‘I’m sure if I’d said, you know, no, he would’ve
stopped’) and on her own agency (‘I continued on, though’), Beres conﬁdently con-
cludes that it doesn’t matter whether or not she said no, because that man would prob-
ably have deliberately ignored her refusal had she articulated it.49
Beres also analyses an interview with Don, aged 26, who, when asked what he would
do if his female partner seemed uncomfortable, replied with the following:
I just sort of slow it down and make sure she is comfortable and if there is anything
that is on her mind. You know it’s really how far into things you are because you
don’t just kill it, by saying ‘is everything okay?’ ‘do you have a boyfriend?’ …
It’s stuff like that really kills it, so you just sort of have to like, it’s almost like you
take it back down to take it down a notch and then work back up to, like tear it apart
and rebuild it and sort of start from scratch again. Not like put on your clothes and
start all over again but… Yeah take it down a notch, makes sure she’s comfortable.
Beres treats this passage as an admission that Don (and, by implication, men more
generally) prefers non-verbal communication because it provides a useful cover for sex-
ual coercion: ‘His persistence at pursuing sex results from a lack of willingness to hear
his partners’ refusal, not for mistakenly believing that she was comfortable and wanted
to continue with the sexual activity.’50 In assessing how much we can draw from this
study, it is important to keep in mind that in the case of both Jane and Don the refusals
that Beres refers to (and the cynicism with which they are met) only ever exist as a
hypothesis that is conditional upon things turning out as the researcher imagines. Beres’
claim that she has, as a result of her interviews, ‘found’ that men use miscommunication
cynically thus relies heavily on supplementing her empirical ﬁndings with general and
theoretical assumptions as regards the roles of men (coercers) and women (victims) and47. Beres, above n 40, at 5–6, 8–9. For example, to quote Beres on the subject of ‘tacit knowl-
edge’: ‘When participants were asked about how they understand their partner’s willingness to
engage in certain sexual activities, almost all participants responded by saying that it is easy to
determine when someone was interested in casual sex – “you just know”’ (at 5).
48. Ibid, at 10.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 13on how sex and consent ought to work. A more credible approach to analysing narra-
tives on sexual attitudes and behaviours is that adopted by Jozkowski and Peterson.
In contrast to Beres, they are hesitant about drawing strong conclusions – in their case,
from ﬁnding that 27.1% of the 185 youngmen they sampled endorsed using ‘aggressive
strategies’ to gain consent, such as ‘telling their partners they were going to have sex
with them’ – due to the possibility of different readings of the data.51 Jozkowski and
Peterson’s analysis equivocates as to whether such language as used by these young
men implies ‘a direct order’ signifying that any refusal would not be listened to, or else
is merely the result of ‘imprecise semantics, such that the men could really just mean
that they would engage in a dialogue to determine consent’.52
The problem with conﬁdently categorising miscommunication as a myth seems to be
an uncomfortable dissonance between facts and norms. Kitzinger and Frith, for exam-
ple, reluctantly admit that as politically problematic as it is to say it, the fact that there
are sexual scripts in which a refusal is given in full and positive anticipation that it be
overcome undercuts our desire simply to afﬁrm the purer normative position on mis-
communication that ‘No’ (or indirect cues that similarly signal reluctance) ought only
ever to mean no to all people in all contexts.53 Unlike Beres, the analyses given by
Kitzinger and Frith and by Jozkowski and Peterson are sensitive to the possibly
distortive consequences of deeming miscommunication to be a myth and hence re-
moved from the realm of empirical, contingent fact altogether.
These remarks should certainly not be taken either as denying that miscommunica-
tion can often be used cynically, or as trivialising the worrying consequences of holding
women ‘responsible’ for disabusing men of a sense of sexual entitlement. But if we are
going to make use of the available empirical research at all, then it seems to me that we
cannot rely solely on studies that indicate that miscommunication is a lie while
dismissing as politically unacceptable studies that suggest that actual sexual practices
make miscommunication a genuine possibility. If that possibility exists, then there
are reasons to be concerned about the further carceral implications of pursuing the ar-
gument that a response to an alleged rape or sexual assault that is receptive to a plea
of miscommunication amounts to victim-blame. There is a difﬁcult balance to be struck
here, and we should be slow to use the discourse of rape myths merely to endorse an-
other myth by implication: namely, that sexual behaviours that deviate from the norm
are inherently and essentially coercive. Ellison and Munro warn of this danger in their
perceptive criticism of their mock jurors, who seemed unconsciously to endorse tradi-
tionally stereotyped and scripted differences between ‘normal sex’ and rape on the basis
of where the incident in question had taken place.54 Some jurors found it hard to be-
lieve that any woman would consent to sex in a ‘seedy’ or ‘desperate’ place such as
a stairwell or outdoors in an alleyway, expressing the view that a woman who wants
sex to happen would invite a man to ‘a more comfortable environment’ such as her
own home.55 Ellison and Munro’s analysis highlights just how easy it is to allow tra-
ditionally moralistic assumptions to creep into judgements about sex and consent, as we
shall see below.51. Jozkowski and Peterson, above n 42, at 520.
52. Ibid, at 521.
53. Kitzinger and Frith, above n 41.
54. Ellison and Munro, above n 19.
55. Ibid, at 299.
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14 Legal StudiesDistinguishing the non-consensual from the seedy: ‘Kate’, ‘Sabrina’ and ‘Kelly’
The second of our close readings of Coy et al’s study of young peoples’ understandings
of consent involves two ﬁctional scenarios in which explicit discussion between the
parties as to consent is either absent (‘Kate’) or else undertaken in less than ideal cir-
cumstances (‘Sabrina’). These will then be contrasted against a third, very different,
scenario (‘Kelly’). Coy et al’s respondents were called upon to decide whether or not
the alleged victims were put under such pressure that the sex described cannot be under-
stood as consensual. Although, as I have noted above, Coy et al are alert to the possi-
bility that their respondents may have been led astray by stereotypes, there are
reasons to think that the researchers themselves may have allowed themselves to be
similarly misled. They show this by their failure to distinguish between two quite
separate questions: whether consent was negated by constraint on the one hand, and
the normative quality of the sexual activity in question on the other. In determining
whether a crime was committed, only the former question is relevant. In a scenario
involving a 14-year-old girl called Kate, for example, Kate has sex with three boys at
a friend’s house and is ﬁlmed doing so. Shortly before that, the boys had ‘annoyed’Kate
by making crude remarks about her breasts. They had ‘snatched her phone’, offering to
return it only if she kissed them, and had told her to ‘show some effort’.56
We are not given any other information as to Kate’s own thoughts or feelings. But for
Coy et al, these details are sufﬁcient to indicate that she gave no consent to the sex that
followed, and that, furthermore, to expect a girl or young woman in her position to say
no is evidence of victim-blame. Respondents who suggested that she may have been
capable of exercising any kind of agency despite this setting are admonished by the re-
searchers for ‘implicating’ the victim and ‘inviting’ her own rape.57 Coy et al’s point is
that in ﬁnding herself outnumbered, with her property effectively stolen and in unfamil-
iar surroundings, Kate considered that she had no choice. This is an intuitively attractive
analysis, of course, since it appeals to us to consider the likely effect of a power imbal-
ance between the parties. Coy et al are certainly right to the extent that there is enough
information in the narrative to suppose that a properly directed jury may well conclude
that Kate was raped. But I would question the researchers’ claim to have actually
established that, by considering Kate’s opportunities to ‘speak up’, the respondents
are engaging in victim-blame as opposed to legitimate and proper analysis of her free-
dom to choose. In Coy et al’s analysis of the scene, the sense of coercion is not
established by scrutinising Kate’s opportunities to refuse, and the reason for this seems
to be that they believe that such scrutiny inevitably constitutes victim-blame.What sup-
plies the necessary ‘proof’ of coercion, therefore, is the normative quality (ie the seedy
quality) of the sexual behaviour described, which is not necessarily connected to con-
sent at all. In other words, we are directed to the fact that the scene involves: (a) sex be-
tween one girl and a group of boys (two of whom she hadn’t previously met); (b) a
bartering of sex for the return of property; and (c) the ﬁlming of the incident (again,
without Kate’s consent), which could represent the objectifying male gaze in general.
These are all activities that Coy et al seem to believe no young woman would or could
freely consent to, and thus such a scene could only be a description of a rape. To repeat:56. Coy et al, above n 18, p 27.
57. Ibid, pp 29–31. Examples of such contributions included the following: ‘“she didn’t open
her mouth, she can talk herself can’t she? She’s got her ownmouth, if she didn’t want to she didn’t
have to do it…’ (female, aged 16); ‘why didn’t she just go “well you can havemy phone then, I’m
not screwing all three of you”’ (male, aged 17)’.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 15the researchers are quite right to insist that contextual information that is suggestive of
refusal is relevant to the questions of consent and coercion. But in order to avoid the
accusation of conﬂating two different issues (coercion that negates the possibility of
consent and the normative value or quality of the sexual acts depicted) and thereby
of mischaracterising respondents’ attitudes, researchers must also counter the sugges-
tion that deviation from ‘normal sex’ characterises coercion.
Consider also another of Coy et al’s scenarios, this time involving 13-year-old
Sabrina, who is described giving 14-year-old Amir oral sex. We are told that Amir
had invited Sabrina to his house, that he instigated sexual activity by showing her por-
nography and asked her to ‘kiss’ his penis. He furthermore told her that she made him
‘hard’ and in response to her hesitation said ‘I thought you liked me too’; he was force-
ful while the sexual activity actually took place, ‘holding her head down’ until he was
‘ﬁnished’.58 We also glean evidence of her reluctance from information such as ‘she
didn’t want him to think she was frigid’, that ‘she didn’t know what to do’, that she
‘had never done anything like this before’ and that afterwards she ‘just wanted to go
home’.59 Again, it would be strange if our sympathy were not immediately drawn to
such a young and timid girl, who seems to be the victim of pressure to conform to an-
other (apparently older and more experienced) person’s sexual fantasy. Indeed, for Coy
et al, this collected information as regards Amir’s pressure and Sabrina’s passivity
clearly adds up to rape, and the researchers once again despondently report that ‘a third
of young people did not recognize’ rape in the scenario (31.6%), and that only ‘a small
number’ (37.4%) thought that Amir’s ‘manipulation’ constituted a constraint on
Sabrina’s ‘freedom to consent’.60 What Coy et al at no point consider, however, is
whether their own analysis of the scenario might have been affected by the obviously
‘seedy’ or non-normative qualities of the sexual behaviour, or whether the respondents
who were doubtful about it as depicting a rape may simply have recognised that the use
of pornography and mild force (such as holding the head of a person performing oral
sex) are both elements of a particular sexual script involving initiation and domination.
While adherence to such a script may not exactly indicate a progressive view of sex as
regards gender equality, nor does it in itself establish victimisation or coercion without
further details.61 Unless and until the possible inﬂuence of the pointedly seedy norma-
tive quality of the sex involved is excluded, Coy et al’s conclusion – that respondents
who failed to identify it as rape are engaging in victim-blame – is premature and
potentially misleading. The factual question of consent and the normative quality of
the setting against which we judge consent are two different issues, which need to be
kept separate.
By contrast, the study’s ‘control’ scenario, which Coy et al use ‘as a debrief at the
end of the survey, written to depict both communicative consent, and the possibility of
deciding jointly not to have sex’, oozes sexual normativity as well as depicting the
‘correct’ way for a boy to respond appropriately to a girl’s silent cues. The scenario58. Ibid, p 31.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid, pp 31–32.
61. Obviously Sabrina’s young agemakes her consent invalid in any case, but this is also true of
Amir. On the potential for ambiguity in interpreting limited information about sexual behaviours
and attitudes, see Jozkowski and Peterson, above n 42, p 521, who suggest that men who report
being prepared to use force in a sexual encounter ‘may be imprecisely referring to direct, asser-
tive, or passionate initiation with a sexual partner during a sexual encounter rather than actual
physical force’.
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16 Legal Studiesdepicts a 14-year-old girl called Kelly and a boy (presumably the same age) called Eli.
It takes place in the bedroom, not in a seedy stairwell, alleyway or toilet cubicle. Eli
has been Kelly’s ‘boyfriend’ for 4 months without the pair yet having had sex –
deﬁnitely not strangers ‘hooking-up’ or using sex as part of some unwholesome
bargain. They have been studying together when the question of whether to engage
in sexual activity arises – not drinking, or taking drugs and so on. The scene involves
no ‘extras’ or technology for making potentially exploitative DIY porn, and in any
event involves only very mild sexual activity, short of penetration or even genital
touching (he immediately backed off when she ‘ﬂinched’ upon touching his penis).62
As an educational tool for teaching young adolescents about respecting potential
sexual partners and responding to their cues, getting them to reﬂect on this scenario
is a positive idea. I do not doubt that a number of Coy et al’s young participants
probably beneﬁted from the chance to do so. But if researchers are to gain a fuller
understanding of the relationship (if any) between victim-blame and rape myth accep-
tance, then they must take more care than do Coy et al to avoid falling into endorsing
what Ellison and Munro usefully identify as the traditional and moralistic distinction
between ‘normal sex’ and ‘real rape’. In order to avoid marginalising or stigmatising
certain kinds of sexualities and practices that attract obvious suspicion and disapproval
from a moral point of view, this means concerning ourselves instead with the
opportunities that a potential complainant might have had or not had for offering a
refusal in the circumstances in which she found herself. To respond to an alleged rape
or sexual assault by asking whether D’s actions actually did prevent her from doing so
is not to engage in victim-blame, but in entirely appropriate scrutiny.3. VICTIM-BLAME, AND CHOICE AS MYTH
Does ‘choice’ mean ‘victim-blame’?
A third way in which victim-blame arguably intersects with rape myth acceptance
requires us to think more deeply about the possibility of choice under compromised
conditions and the liberal ideology that underpins law’s determination that such a
choice may be valid. Of course, there is no space here for a detailed examination
of that debate. However, it is pertinent to consider whether we sometimes hear the
liberal insistence ‘you had a choice’63 as a judgemental ‘it was your own fault’,
and as perpetuating victim-blame by constructing certain types of male pressure as
mere inducements, and women’s submission due to (say) economic hardship as
exercising agency. The English legal meaning of ‘freedom’ to consent, according
to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, is a liberal formulation in the sense that, absent
one of the limited number of circumstances in which lack of consent may be
presumed, whether the complainant had sufﬁcient freedom to make a choice is a62. Coy et al, above n 18, p 34.
63. For a scholarly defence of the possibility of ‘choice’ under compromised circumstances, see
D Dripps ‘Men, women and rape’ (1994) 63(1) Fordham L Rev 125 at 139–147. The question of
whether the law itself engages in victim-blame arose in the wake of R v Bree [2007] All ER (D)
412 (Mar), in which Sir Igor Judge P ruled, at para 34, that: ‘[W]here the complainant has volun-
tarily consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains capable of choos-
ing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to do so, this would not be rape.’ For a
critique of this judgment that engages in victim-blaming on the basis of a woman’s ‘prior fault’ in
voluntarily getting drunk, see Wallerstein, above n 3, particularly pp 324–328.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 17question of fact.64 A jury must weigh constraining factors in the balance in consid-
ering whether they amount to a negation of choice. In this way, English law distin-
guishes between consent that may be valid notwithstanding that it was given in
response to an inducement rather than authentic sexual desire, and mere submission
to threats or coercion.65 In other words, consent (and for that matter the idea of
choice) is not negated simply because it was given for reasons other than the con-
sent-giver’s own sexual desire, nor because she gave it under less than unfettered
circumstances.66
But despite this recognition by law that choices may bemade in imperfect conditions,
the point at which ‘inducement’ shades into ‘coercion’ is not always clear, and legiti-
mate concerns arise about the extent to which juries may be willing or able to call it ap-
propriately. Taking a critical view on how ordinary people (jurors or otherwise) are to
distinguish the two sets of circumstances without falling into victim-blaming raises
some difﬁcult questions. For example, when ought a lack of desire to engage in sex, ex-
cept in order to receive something in return, be understood to negate choice? Secondly,
does considering whether there were possible alternatives (to sex) that might have been
open to a woman in such circumstances necessarily fail to appreciate the coercive nature
of ostensibly non-threatening or non-violent ‘offers’, thus constituting victim-blame?
Feminist critical perspectives on liberal law’s apparent approval of choices under poten-
tially coercive circumstances have long grappled with the question of how – if at all – to
accommodate a woman’s own self-perception. Some commentators – for example,
Karen Busby – have argued that since any given case inevitably exists within a culture
of patriarchal assumptions about female availability and male entitlement, we may be
justiﬁed in treating a woman who claims to have exercised agency under constrained
circumstances with scepticism.67 In a publication from 2011, Coy, Thiara and Kelly
argued that a girl or young woman who engages in ‘risk taking behaviour such as
getting in cars with boys; swapping sexual acts for gifts, alcohol, peer approval; and
involvement in more formalised prostitution’ is already engaging in activity that is
‘potentially … abusive’ even if not viewed as such by the girl or woman involved.68
This scepticism about a woman’s insight into her own victimisation is echoed, as we
have seen, by empirical analyses such as Beres’ reading of a female interviewee’s
explanation that sex ‘just kind of happened’ as an attempt to avoid confronting the truth
of her partner’s readiness to rape her.69 We have also seen that Littleton’s research on
young women’s ‘re-victimising’ behaviours leads her to propose setting aside the idea
of ‘choice’. Others still have argued that to focus, as we have done here, upon that
‘moment of agreement’ in which consent may have been given is to impose a further
danger on women. According to this argument, ostensibly egalitarian regimes that64. Section 74 deﬁnes consent as being where a person ‘agrees by choice, and has the freedom
and capacity to make that choice’; s 75 lists six circumstances (s 75(2)(a–f)) in which there is an
evidential presumption that the complainant did not consent.
65. A position that in English law derives from the pre-SOA case of R v Olugboja [1982]
QB 320.
66. See Dripps, above n 63.
67. K Busby ‘Every breath you take: erotic asphyxiation, vengeful wives, and other enduring
myths in spousal sexual assault prosecutions’ (2012) 24 Can J Women & L 328.
68. MCoy, R Thiara and L Kelly Boys Think Girls Are Toys? An Evaluation of the NIA Project
Prevention Programme on Sexual Exploitation, Final report (London: Child and Woman Abuse
Studies Unit, London Metropolitan University, 2011) (my emphasis).
69. Beres, above n 40.
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18 Legal Studiesprotect non-normative sexualities by insisting that ‘yes means yes’ mean imposing a
risk-management responsibility on women. From this perspective, then, for law to treat
a woman’s ‘yes’ as ‘yes’ in circumstances that are also potentially exploitative, harmful
and humiliating leads these risks, as well as the risk associated with any ambiguity
about the authenticity of that agreement, to fall on her.70
However, the dangers of understanding victim-blaming attitudes by framing choice
as a dangerous ﬁction in particular settings makes two untenable assumptions. The ﬁrst
of these is that the costs of applying the violence of criminal justice against men to
circumscribe consent in difﬁcult contexts are always outweighed by the beneﬁts, and
that incarceration does not itself inﬂict signiﬁcant harm and humiliation to be weighed
against the harm of an overly broad understanding of sexual victimisation. However,
we know that this is not the case and, furthermore, that penal sanctions in practice tend
to fall disproportionately on already marginalised and disadvantaged members of
society. This is a criticism of the ‘carceral’ implications feminist critiques of consent
that invoke criminal justice, which has been explored elsewhere and is beyond the scope
of this discussion.71 The second assumption is that it is possible in any case to isolate a
broad category of circumstances that, by virtue of their exploitative or potentially harmful
quality, are inimical to the very idea of female agency. It is with this point in mind that we
turn to the last of our close readings of Coy et al’s study of how young people in England
understand consent.
Survival sex: ‘Chelsea’
We have already noted that elsewhere in their study Coy et al cite, as evidence of
victim-blaming attitudes, suggestions by their respondents that the girls and young
women depicted had made a ‘choice’ in circumstances where their freedom to choose
was constrained in some way. In a scenario involving 16-year-old Chelsea and 23-year-
old Steve, they make this the central point. The scenario depicts what Coy et al describe
as ‘survival’ sex. Chelsea, who is drunk and homeless, takes up Steve’s offer that she
may sleep on his sofa in return for giving him oral sex, despite being ‘tired and wanting
to be left alone’. In the weeks that follow, she repeatedly returns to Steve’s ﬂat, each
time allowing Steve to do ‘what he wants to Chelsea’, since she is ‘scared’ of being back
on the streets.72
It would not be unreasonable to agree once more with Coy et al that someone in
Chelsea’s position might well feel that their freedom to make a choice is limited to
the extent of being altogether negated. At the very least, there is little doubt that Steve’s
actions are exploitative in an ethical sense, since he not only derives a beneﬁt from
Chelsea, but he furthermore uses her own disadvantaged and vulnerable position as a
homeless person in order to do so.73 However, Coy et al’s purpose in using this70. L Gotell ‘Governing heterosexuality through speciﬁc consent: interrogating the govern-
mental effects of R. v. J.A.’ (2012) 24 Can J Women & L 360; E Craig ‘Consent to a sexual risk’
(2014) 17(1) New Crim L Rev 103. For empirical research on attitudes towards the use of pres-
sure and the traditional sexual script, see eg E Strang et al ‘Discrepant responding across self-re-
port measure of men’s coercive and aggressive sexual strategies’ (2013) 50(5) J Sex Res 458; also
Clark and Carroll, above n 37.
71. See U Khan Vicarious Kinks: S/M in the Socio-Legal Imaginary (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2014) pp. 265–266.
72. Coy et al, above n 18, p 23.
73. J Feinberg The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol IV: Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988) chs 31, 32.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 19scenario is not merely to demonstrate the rightness of this conclusion but, furthermore,
that respondents who failed to come to it themselves are perpetrators of victim-blame.
Coy et al understand their respondents to be demonstrating victim-blaming attitudes by
their failure ‘to think of this [scenario] as legally constituting rape’, with almost half of
respondents thinking of Chelsea as having made the ‘wrong decision’ (46.5% for the ini-
tial sex, and 47.9% for her repeated returns).74 What the researchers fail to mention in
their analysis, but is apparent from their published quantitative data, is that in fact almost
90% of respondents reported being ‘Not OK with the sex described’, three quarters of
them identifying the initial sex as rape, and less than half of respondents identifying
Chelsea as being able to make a choice in either stage. In the light of the principles that
inform it, it is clear that Coy et al’s view of their respondents’ own understanding of the
scenario as problematic is actually a shorthand critique of liberal notions of choice as such.
It is quite right, of course, for Coy et al to be critical of naïve and ideologically embed-
ded assumptions about an individual’s freedom to choose, and in so doing they follow
well-established critical positions on the structural inequalities and constraints ordinarily
obscured beneath liberal ideas of sexual autonomy and agency. The problem with Coy et
al’s analysis of this particular case, however, is that they seem to expect their respondents
to come to the view that no choice is beingmade (and that rape is committed) herewithout
any apparent acknowledgement that a good deal of ‘grey’ lies between the solid ‘black’ of
choice-negating constraint and the brilliant ‘white’ of ideal full freedom. Nor is there any
sense in which the meanings of words such as choice, agency and freedom and the
relationships between these concepts are anything but clear.
If we think about this scenario in relation to the question (posed above) about when a
lack of desire to engage in sex except in order to receive something (somewhere to
sleep, in this case) negates choice, Coy et al have chosen here to use homelessness to
represent an external constraint. But is this to imply that there is something particularly
coercive about this particular constraint, or that any inducement to sex based on an offer
of basic resources is sufﬁciently coercive? We should remember, after all, that
Chelsea’s case (like Coy et al’s other scenarios) is a ﬁction designed to represent a cer-
tain class of case. How widely are we supposed to apply its implications for the ex-
change of sex for food, money, alcohol, drugs and so on? If the right response to
Chelsea’s story is that she is raped and that to deny as much amounts to victim-blame,
then does this not commit one to saying that a sex worker is raped if she relies on the
punters’money for her livelihood? There are, of course, feminist scholars for whom this
would indeed be an acceptable implication, and for whom the difference between pay-
ing for sex and rape is so narrow that both may be deemed criminal offences. Indeed, a
number of legal jurisdictions such as Sweden and more recently Canada and Northern
Ireland have broadly followed this approach.75 However, sex-positive and sex-radical
feminist scholars strongly reject that view,76 and there is no basis for it in England and
Wales, where Coy et al’s research was carried out.74. Coy et al, above n 18, p 25.
75. C MacKinnon Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006); MWaltman ‘Prohibiting sex purchasing and ending trafﬁcking:
the Swedish prostitution law’ (2011–2012) 33 Mich J Int’l L 133. For a critique of the so-called
‘Swedish’model and efforts to implement it in other countries, see Global Network of Sex Work
Projects The Criminalisation of Clients, Brieﬁng Paper 2 (Edinburgh: NSWP); available at
http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/ﬁles/Criminalisation%20of%20Clients-c.pdf (accessed 18
February 2014).
76. Khan, above n 71.
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20 Legal StudiesSecondly, there is the question of whether considering possible alternatives open
to a woman other than trading her body for basic goods and services is to engage
in victim-blaming. Coy et al report that some respondents arrived at their erroneous
view that Chelsea chose sex because, in suggesting that Chelsea should have gone to
a ‘nightshelter’ or ‘somewhere safe’, they were ‘overestimating the extent of support
for homeless young women’.77 But whether such suggestions overestimate the
availability of support in any particular location is another empirical question: it is
not something that can be known a priori in any case, let alone in a ﬁctional one like
this, with no information about local services. We might add to this that at no point
do Coy et al consider whether Chelsea herself regards the ‘offer’ made to her by
Steve as so coercive as to negate her freedom to make a choice. The sex is certainly
unwanted, but wanting and consenting are separate things and should be assessed
separately, as noted above with respect to analysing the ﬂawed research on the use
of scripted refusal and token resistance.78 As Wallerstein has rightly said: ‘To
consent, it is not necessary for me to want the result (though I may very well ‘want’ it),
but I am said to consent to it even if I only accept that it may be brought about
and do not act in order to prevent it.’79 For me, the lack of space within Coy et al’s
perspective to take seriously any suggestion that Chelsea (or a woman in her
position) might have made a different decision is misguided. It implies that the
researchers’ analysis is impervious to empirical or contextual facts, whether about
the parties themselves or their environment. Thus the formula of sofa-for-sex = rape is
for Coy et al a necessary and abstract Truth; to adopt the contrary view is apparently
to deal in myths.CONCLUSION
Nothing in this paper is intended to lend support to the notion that women must ‘take
responsibility’ for behaviours that may or may not contribute to their being targeted
for sexual victimisation. It does not detract in any way from the fundamental premise
that it is rapists and not their victims who are to blame for rape. But in terms of identi-
fying and explaining victim-blaming attitudes in public perceptions of consent and
coercion, this can only ever be a starting point. In seeking to derive general information
about victim-blame and a blame ‘culture’ from the vignette and mock-jury research par-
ticipants’ references to such fraught themes as ‘responsibility’, ‘risk’, ‘miscommunica-
tion’ and ‘choice’, we should be wary about the dangers of drawing out conclusions that
are more far-reaching than the evidence actually allows. All of these themes have, in
various ways, been deemed in relevant feminist-informed literature to be myths, in
the sense that for some they signify a belief about rape that is either factually wrong
or else wrong in an ethical sense, and as such unacceptable in rape discourse. However,
as I have argued here, using rape myth acceptance as a conceptual framework for
understanding whether a particular response constitutes victim-blame may be as likely
to mislead as to guide. A broad review of psychological and sociological research
actually suggests that seeking to exclude certain beliefs as unacceptable may be both77. Coy et al, above n 18, p 25.
78. Muehlenhard and Rogers, above n 45. See also Peterson andMuehlenhard, above n 46, who
demonstrate some ways in which individuals may consent to unwanted sex and conversely desire
sex that is non-consensual.
79. Wallerstein, above n 3, at 325.
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Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance? 21unwarranted and unhelpful.80 Furthermore, analyses of the necessary conditions for
recognising the validity of consent have tended to presuppose a particular (and
contested) normative framework that does not adequately account for individuals
consenting to apparently ‘seedy’ or ‘sexist’ sexual acts. Finally, particular critical
responses to liberal law’s deference to jury discretion in determining the validity of
consent fail to anticipate an individual woman’s capacity for exercising sexual agency
under compromised circumstances. In combination, therefore, as helpful as notions of
rape myth acceptance may be in constructing a critique in broad terms of patriarchal and
liberal ideologies as such, using these to highlight speciﬁc instances of so toxic a
practice as victim-blame is to stretch it beyond the limits of credibility.80. On this point, see further H Reece ‘Debating rape myths’, LSE Law, Society and
Economy Working Papers (21/2014); available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2497844 (accessed 9 July 2015).
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